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♠ I am, as always, deeply conscious of my debt to my friend and colleague, Stefano Zambelli, in the 
preparation of this paper. In particular, his recent work on linking coupled nonlinear dynamics at the 
microeconomic level with aggregate macrodynamics, has been a source of valuable support in the 
'beyond' part of the title of this paper. He is, however, absolved from all responsibilities for the 
remaining infelicities in this paper. ABSTRACT
The genesis and the path towards what has come to be called the DSGE
model is traced, from its origins in the Arrow-Debreu General Equilibrium model
(ADGE), via Scarf￿ s Computable General Equilibrium model (CGE) and its
applied version as Applied Computable General Equilibrium model (ACGE), to
its ostensible dynamization as a Recursive Competitive Equilibrium (RCE). An
outline of a similar nature, albeit very brie￿ y, of the development and structure
of Agent-Based Economics (ABE) is also included. It is shown that these trans-
formations of the ADGE model are computably and constructively untenable.
Suggestions for going ￿ beyond DSGE and ABE￿are, then, outlined on the
basis of a framework that is underpinned ￿from the outset ￿by computability
and constructivity considerations.
JEL Codes: C02, C62, C68, D58, E61
Keywords: Computable General Equilibrium, Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium, Computability, Constructivity, Classical Behavioural Economics.
21 A Preamble
"... the dreadful permanence of a certain second in one￿ s temporary
life."
James Kirkup1
At least until the advent of the recent crisis, the dominance of the DSGE ap-
proach to macrodynamics seemed to have been the accepted benchmark to any-
one attempting serious modelling of policy with rigorous microeconomic foun-
dations. This consensus vision ￿ controversial and not unchallenged even in
the best of times - has come under some increasing sceptical scrutiny, to put it
mildly, in the last three years.
Many competent critiques of the DSGE methodology, with alternative vi-
sions ably formulated, have come to be considered in all circles where, previ-
ously, there was an almost proverbial ￿ one-size-￿ts-all￿philosophy to the math-
ematical modelling of rigorously founded macroeconomics. The New Keynesian
monopoly of alternatives to DSGE visions has, thus, been diluted, albeit not ￿
at least till now ￿entirely supplanted.
Most importantly and interestingly, the many contributions to varieties of
boundedly rational, agent-based, economic dynamics, have taken on the DSGE
visions and methodology squarely and critically, with seemingly challenging re-
sults in formal, rigorous, computational frameworks.
However, all the way from the core contributions to DSGE modelling, phi-
losophy and visions, to current fashions in agent-based economic and ￿nancial
modelling in ostensibly explicit computational frameworks, the underlying as-
sumption seems to have been an uncritical acceptance of the claims on the
mathematical structure of the computable and constructive foundations of the
basic pillars of general equilibrium theory - from their origins in the classic of
Arrow-Debreu General Equilibrium (ADGE), through Scarf￿ s development of
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) theory, to DSGE via Recursive Com-
petitive Equilibrium (RCE).
This paper is a contribution to the critique of the foundations of DSGE
modelling, from an explicitly computable and constructive mathematical point
of view. However, it is a part of the broader framework and vision that this
author has come to call the Computable Approach to Economic Theory, within
which the following eight results have been derived2:
i.Nash equilibria of ￿nite games are constructively indeterminate.
ii.Computable General Equilibria are neither computable nor constructive.
iii.The Two Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics are Uncomputable
and Nonconstructive, respectively.
iv.There is no e⁄ective procedure to generate preference orderings.
1James Kirkup, p. 87, in: These Horned Islands (The Macmillan Company, NY, 1962).
2Apart from the ￿rst and sixth results, which are due to the pioneering works of Tsuji,
Da Costa and Doria ([39]) in 1998 and Michael Rabin ([28]) in 1957, the rest are due to this
author.
3v.Recursive Competitive Equilibria (RCE), underpinning the Real Business
Cycle (RBC) model and, hence, the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
(DSGE) benchmark model of Macroeconomics, are uncomputable.
vi.There are games in which the player who in theory can always win cannot
do so in practice because it is impossible to supply him with e⁄ective instructions
regarding how he/she should play in order to win.
vii.The theoretical benchmarks of Algorithmic Game Theory are uncom-
putable and non-constructive.
viii.Emergent formalisms in Agent-Based Economic Modelling have no foun-
dations in any kind of rigorous algorithmic formalism and, hence, epistemolog-
ically vacuous.
In the next section a brief foray ￿entirely inadequate from any serious point
of view ￿into aspects of non-standard mathematics (and non-standard logic),
relevant for making sense of the rest of the paper, is attempted. In section three
an attempt at dissecting the computable and constructive claims of the varieties
of general equilibrium models that form the foundations of DSGE models is
presented; a brief foray into the untenable claims of aspects of agent-based
economic modelling is also included. The brief concluding section suggests
some constructive and computable ways of going ￿ beyond DSGE￿ .
2 An Ultra-Brief Non-Traditional Mathemati-
cal Excursus
"This is a specimen of intuitionist reasoning in topology, and
in particular an illustration of the consequences of the invalidity
of the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem in intuitionism, for the validity
of the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem would make the classical and
intuitionist forms of the ￿xed-point theorms equivalent."
[4], p. 1; italics added.
Brouwer, in the above quote, is ￿of course ￿referring to his celebrated ￿xed-
point theorem, widely used in mathematical economics in its original form, or in
one or another of its ￿ generalizations￿ , by Kakutani, KKM3, etc. On the other
hand, just because a ￿xed-point theorem is invalid from an intuitionistic point
of view4 does not necessarily mean that it is non-constructive or uncomputable
from mathematical points of view claiming allegiance to other forms of con-
structivism and varieties of computability theories. The point here, however,
is the role of the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem and its intrinsic undecidable
disjunctions, which make any theorem invoking it in its proof fundamentally
3An acronym for Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz.
4We are ￿ advised￿ , in a recent advanced textbook in Real Analysis with Economic
Applications ([27], p. 279, footnote 47), ￿ if [we] want to learn about intuitionism in mathe-
matics￿ , to do so ￿ in [our] spare time, please￿! The footnote in which this ￿ advice￿appears is
replete with elementary mathematical and biographical errors (on Brouwer).
4non-constructive and uncomputable from any (known) mathematical point of
view.
In this author￿ s considered and studied belief, the key advance from the
pure mathematics of general equilibrium theory and game theory is the claim
by adherents of CGE, RCE, RBC, SDGE and, most recently, also by those
practitioners of algorithmic game theory (AGE), that the theoretically proved
equilibrium existence theorems, in the respective ￿elds, can be given construc-
tive and computable content. This is a belief based on explicit claims by eminent
practitioners of CGE, RCE, RBC, SDGE and AGE5. If these claims are to re-
tain their validity from this particular point of view, the mathematics in which
their formalism is clothed must be constructively or computably meaningful.
As Jeremy Avigad perceptively noted, recently6:
￿[The] adoption of the in￿nitary, nonconstructive, set theoretic,
algebraic, and structural methods that are characteristic to mod-
ern mathematics [....] were controversial, however. At issue was
not just whether they are consistent, but, more pointedly, whether
they are meaningful and appropriate to mathematics. After all, if
one views mathematics as an essentially computational science, then
arguments without computational content, whatever their heuristic
value, are not properly mathematical. .. [At] the bare minimum,
we wish to know that the universal assertions we derive in the sys-
tem will not be contradicted by our experiences, and the existential
predictions will be borne out by calculation. This is exactly what
Hilbert￿ s program7 was designed to do.￿
[1], pp. 64-5; italics added
Thus, my claim is that the existential predictions made by the purely the-
oretical part of mathematical economics, game theory and economic theory
￿ will [not] be borne out by calculations.￿ There is, therefore, a serious epis-
temological de￿cit ￿in the sense of economically relevant knowledge that can
be processed and accessed computationally and experimentally ￿in all of the
above approaches, claims to the contrary notwithstanding, that is unrecti￿able
without wholly abandoning their current mathematical foundations. This is an
epistemological de￿cit even before considering the interaction between appeals
to in￿nite ￿even uncountably in￿nite ￿methods and processes in proofs, where
both the universal and existential quanti￿ers are freely used in such contexts,
5Explicit references to substantiate this claim can be found in [43] and [44], as well as in
the sequel, below.
6Avigad￿ s important observation was made in the context of The Mathematics of Ergodic
Theory. It is only necessary for the critically minded mathematical economist or economic
theorist simply to substitute ￿ economic￿for ￿ ergodic￿and nothing would change in the impli-
cations.
7I have tried to make the case for interpreting the philosophy and methodology of math-
ematical economics and economic theory in terms of the discipline of Hilbert￿ s program in
[47].
5and the ￿nite numerical instances8 with which they are, ostensibly, ￿ justi￿ed￿ .
This epistemological de￿cit requires even ￿ deeper￿mathematical and philosoph-
ical considerations in Cantor￿ s Paradise9 of ordinals10 , where combinatorics,
too, have to be added to computable and constructive worlds to make sense of
claims by various mathematical economists and agent based modeling practi-
tioners.
3 Five ￿ Impossible￿Computable and Construc-
tive Claims In ADGE, CGE, RCE & ABE
Alice: There is no use trying; one can￿ t believe impossible things.
White Queen: I dare say you haven￿ t had much practice. When I
was your age, I always did it for half an hour a day. Why, sometimes
I￿ ve believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast.
Computable and constructive claims are routinely made by theorists and
policy oriented practitioners whose work forms the basis of one or another aspect
of an eventual DSGE model that ends up by being the foundation for serious
policy applications. I shall, in a slight variation of Lewis Carrol￿ s wisdom, take
up only ￿ ￿ve impossible things￿that are of relevance in the context of this paper.
Given that I have listed eight results in the Preamble, I could easily multiply
impossible examples quite liberally; but it will be su¢ cient to stick to this slight
variation in Lewis Carrol￿ s wisdom, at least for the limited purposes of the aims
of this paper.
8SerØnyi￿ s ([33]) very recent re￿ections and results on this issue will play an important part
in the theoretical underpinnings to be developed in this paper, when viewed from the point
of view of the computable approach to economics (p.49; italics added):
￿An argument deriving the truth of a universal arithmetical sentence from that
of its numerical instances suggests that the truth of the numerical instances has
some kind of epistemological priority over the truth of the sentence itself: our
knowledge of the truth of the sentence stems from the fact that we know all
its numerical instances to be true. .. I shall show that it is just the other way
around. ... [T]he source of our knowledge of the truth of the totality of its
numerical instances is the truth of the sentence itself.￿
9Hilbert did not want to be driven out of ￿ Cantor￿ s Paradise￿([15]; p.191):
￿ No one shall drive us out of the paradise which Cantor has created for us.￿
To which the brilliant ￿ Brouwerian￿response, if I may be forgiven for stating it this way, by
Wittgenstein was ([54]; p.103):
￿ I would say, "I wouldn￿ t dream of trying to drive anyone out of this paradise."
I would try to do something quite di⁄erent: I would try to show you that it is
not a paradise ￿ so that you￿ ll leave of your own accord. I would say, You￿ re
welcome to this; just look about you." ￿
10Where ￿ Ramsey Theory￿ , ￿ Goodstein Sequences￿ and the ￿ Goodstein theorem￿ , reign
supreme. In work in progress these issues are dealt with in some detail, as they pertain
to bridging the ￿ epistemological de￿cit￿in economic theoretical discourse in the mathematical
mode.
63.1 The Nonconstructive Aspect of Brouwer￿ s Theorem
In Scarf￿ s classic book of 1973 there is the following characteristically careful
caveat to any unquali￿ed claims to constructivity of the algorithm he had de-
vised:
"In applying the algorithm it is, in general, impossible to select
an ever ￿ner sequence of grids and a convergent sequence of sub-
simplices. An algorithm for a digital computer must be basically
￿nite and cannot involve an in￿nite sequence of successive re￿ne-
ments. ....... The passage to the limit is the nonconstructive aspect
of Brouwer￿ s theorem, and we have no assurance that the subsimplex
determined by a ￿ne grid of vectors on S contains or is even close
to a true ￿xed point of the mapping."
[30], p.52; italics added
An algorithm, by de￿nition, is a ￿nite object, consisting of a ￿nite sequence
of instructions. However, such a ￿nite object is perfectly compatible with ￿ an
in￿nite sequence of successive re￿nements￿([30], p. 52), provided a stopping rule
associated with a clearly speci￿ed and veri￿able approximation value is part of
the sequence of instructions that characterize the algorithm. Moreover, it is not
￿ the passage to the limit [that] is the nonconstructive aspect of Brouwer￿ s [￿x
point] theorem￿(ibid, p.52)11. Instead, the sources of non-constructivity are
the undecidable disjunctions - i.e., appeal to the law of the excluded middle in
in￿nitary instances - intrinsic to the choice of a convergent subsequence in the
use of the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem12 and an appeal to the law of double
negation in an in￿nitary instance during a retraction. The latter reliance inval-
idates the proof in the eyes of the Brouwerian constructivists; the former makes
11In [31], p. 1024, Scarf is more precise about the reasons for the failure of constructivity
in the proof of Brouwer￿ s ￿x point theorem:
"In order to demonstrate Brouwer￿ s theorem completely we must consider a
sequence of subdivisions whose mesh tends to zero. Each such subdivision will
yield a completely labeled simplex and, as a consequence of the compactness of
the unit simplex, there is a convergent subsequence of completely labeled sim-
plices all of whose vertices tend to a single point x￿. (This is, of course, the
non-constructive step in demonstrating Brouwer￿ s theorem, rather than provid-
ing an approximate ￿xed point)."
There are two points to be noted: ￿rst of all, even here Scarf does not pinpoint quite
precisely to the main culprit for the cause of the non-constructivity in the proof of Brouwer￿ s
theorem; secondly, nothing in the construction of the algorithm provides a justi￿cation to
call the value generated by it to be an approximation to x￿. In fact the value determined by
Scarf￿ s algorithm has no theoretically meaningful connection with x￿ (i.e., to p￿) for it to be
referred to as an approximate equilibrium.
12Just for ease of reading the discussion in this section I state, here, the simplest possible
statement of this theorem:
Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem: Every bounded sequence contains a con-
vergent subsequence
7it constructively invalid from the point of view of every school of constructivism,
whether they accept or deny intuitionistic logic.
Brouwer￿ s proof of his celebrated ￿x point theorem was indirect in two ways:
he proved, ￿rst, the following:
Theorem 1 Given a continuous map of the disk onto itself with no ￿xed points,
9 a continuous retraction of the disk to its boundary.
Having proved this, he then took its contrapositive:
Theorem 2 If there is no continuous retraction of the disk to its boundary then
there is no continuous map of the disk to itself without a ￿xed point.
Using the logical principle of equivalence between a proposition and its con-
trapositive (i.e., logical equivalence between theorems 7 & 8) and the law of
double negation (@ a continuous map with no ￿xed point = 9 a continuous map
with a ￿xed point) Brouwer demonstrated the existence of a ￿xed point for a
continuous map of the disk to itself. This latter principle is what makes the
proof of the Brouwer ￿x point theorem via retractions (or the non-retraction
theorem) essentially unconstructi￿able. Scarf￿ s attempt to discuss the ￿ relation-
ship between these two theorems [i.e., between the non-retraction and Brouwer
￿x point theorems] and to interpret [his] combinatorial lemma [on e⁄ectively
labelling a restricted simplex] as an example of the non-retraction theorem is
incongruous. This is because Scarf, too, like the Brouwer at the time of the origi-
nal proof of his ￿x-point theorem, uses the full paraphernalia of non-constructive
logical principles to link the Brouwer and non-retraction theorems and his com-
binatorial lemma13.
3.2 Scarf￿ s Fixed Point Algorithms are Constructive
The economic foundations of CGE models lie in Uzawa￿ s Equivalence Theorem
([41], [9], p.719, ⁄); the mathematical foundations are underpinned by topologi-
cal ￿x point theorems (Brouwer, Kakutani, etc.). The claim that such models are
computable or constructive rests on mathematical foundations of an algorithmic
nature: i.e., on recursion theory or some variety of constructive mathematics. It
is a widely held belief that CGE models are both constructive and computable.
That the latter property is held to be true of CGE models is evident even from
the generic name given to this class of models; that the former characterization
is a feature of such models is claimed in standard expositions and applications
of CGE models. For example in the well known, and pedagogically elegant,
textbook by two of the more prominent advocates of applied CGE modelling
in policy contexts, John Shoven and John Whalley ([34]), the following explicit
claim is made:
13Scarf uses, in addition, proof by contradiction where, implicitly, LEM (tertium non datur)
is also invoked in the context of an in￿nitary instance (cf. [31], pp. 1026-7).
8"The major result of postwar mathematical general equilibrium the-
ory has been to demonstrate the existence of such an equilibrium by
showing the applicability of mathematical ￿xed point theorems to
economic models. ... Since applying general equilibrium models to
policy issues involves computing equilibria, these ￿xed point theo-
rems are important: It is essential to know that an equilibrium exists
for a given model before attempting to compute that equilibrium.
.....
...
The weakness of such applications is twofold. First, they provide
non-constructive rather than constructive proofs of the existence of
equilibrium; that is, they show that equilibria exist but do not pro-
vide techniques by which equilibria can actually be determined. Sec-
ond, existence per se has no policy signi￿cance. .... Thus, ￿xed point
theorems are only relevant in testing the logical consistency of mod-
els prior to the models￿use in comparative static policy analysis;
such theorems do not provide insights as to how economic behavior
will actually change when policies change. They can only be em-
ployed in this way if they can be made constructive (i.e., be used to
￿nd actual equilibria). The extension of the Brouwer and Kakutani
￿xed point theorems in this direction is what underlies the work of
Scarf .... on ￿xed point algorithms ...."
ibid, pp12, 20-1; italics added
Quite apart from a direct implication of the results of the previous sub-
section falsifying the above claims, they are also untenable because the Uzawa
Equivalence Theorem is provably undecidable. This is the topic of the next
subsection.
3.3 The Uzawa Equivalence Theorem
The Uzawa Equivalence theorem is the fulcrum around which the theory of
CGE modelling revolves. This key theorem14 provides the theoretical justi￿ca-
tion for relying on the use of the algorithms that have been devised for determin-
ing general economic equilibria as ￿x points using essentially non-constructive
topological arguments. The essential content of the theorem is the mathematical
equivalence between a precise statement of Walras￿Existence Theorem (WET)
and Brouwer￿ s (or any other relevant) Fix-Point Theorem. To study the al-
gorithmic - i.e., computable and constructive - content of the theorem, it is
necessary to analyse the assumptions underpinning WET, the nature of the
proof of economic equilibrium existence in WET and the nature of the proof
14To the best of my knowledge, none of the standard advanced textbooks in mathematical
economics, microeconomics or general equilibrium theory (Kreps, Varian, etc.), except the
two by Cornwall ([8]) and Starr ([36]), even refer to Uzawa￿ s theorem.
9of equivalence. By the ￿ nature of the proof￿I mean, of course, the construc-
tive content in the logical procedures used in the demonstrations- whether, for
example, the law of double negation or the law of the excluded middle (LEM:
tertium non datur) is invoked in non-￿nitary instances. Therefore, I shall, ￿rst,
state an elementary version of WET (cf., [41], p. 60 or [36], p. 136).
Theorem 3 Walras￿Existence Theorem (WET)
Let the excess demand function, X(p) = [x1(p);:::::::;xn(p)], be a mapping
from the price simplex, S, to the RN
commodity space; i.e., X(p) : S ! RN
where:
i). X(p) is continuous for all prices, p 2 S
ii). X(p) is homogeneous of degree 0;
iii). p:X(p) = 0;8p 2 S (Walras￿Law holds:
n X
i=1
pixi(p) = 0, 8p 2 S)15
Then:
9p￿ 2 S; s.t., X(p￿) ￿ 0, with p￿
i = 0; 8i, s.t., Xi(p￿) < 0
The ￿nesse in this half of the equivalence theorem, i.e., that WET implies
the Brouwer ￿x point theorem, is to show the feasibility of devising16 a contin-
uous excess demand function, X(p), satisfying Walras￿Law (and homogeneity),
from an arbitrary continuous function, say f(:) : S ! S, such that the equilib-
rium price vector implied by X(p) is also the ￿x point for f(:), from which it is
￿ constructed￿ . The key step in proceeding from a given, arbitrary, f(:) : S ! S




















From (1) and (2), the following excess demand function, X(p), is de￿ned:
15As far as possible I attempt to retain ￿delity to Uzawa￿ s original notation and structure
even although more general formulations are possible. .
16I have to seek recourse to words such as ￿ devise￿to avoid the illegitimate use of mathe-
matically loaded terms like ￿ construction￿ , ￿ choice￿ , ￿ choose￿ , etc., that the literature on CGE
modelling is replete with, signifying, illegitimately, possibilities of meaningful - i.e., algorith-
mic - ￿ construction￿ , ￿ choice￿ , etc. For example, Uzawa, at this point, states: "We construct
an excess demand function.." (op.cit, p.61; italics added; Starr, at a comparable stage of the
proof states: "If we have constructed [the excess demand function] cleverly enough..." (op.cit.,





) ￿ pi￿(p) (3)
i.e.,
X(p) = f(p) ￿ ￿(p)p (4)
It is simple to show that (3) [or (4)] satis￿es (i)-(iii) of Theorem 3 and,
hence, 9p￿ s.t., X(p￿) ￿ 0 (with equality unless p￿ = 0). Elementary (non-
constructive) logic and economics then imply that f(p￿) = p￿. I claim that the
procedure that leads to the de￿nition of (3) [or, equivalently, (4)] to determine
p￿is provably undecidable. In other words, the crucial scalar in (1) cannot be
de￿ned recursion theoretically (and, a fortiori, constructively) to e⁄ectivize a
sequence of projections that would ensure convergence to the equilibrium price
vector.
Theorem 4 X(p￿), as de￿ned in (3) [or (4)] above is undecidable; i.e., cannot
be determined algorithmically.
Proof. Suppose, contrariwise, there is an algorithm which, given an arbitrary
f(:) : S ! S, determines X(p￿). This means, therefore, in view of (i)-(iii)
of Theorem 1, that the given algorithm determines the equilibrium p￿ implied
by WET. In other words, given the arbitrary initial conditions p 2 S and
f(:) : S ! S, the assumption of the existence of an algorithm to determine
X(p￿) implies that its halting con￿gurations are decidable. But this violates the
undecidability of the Halting Problem for Turing Machines. Hence, the assump-
tion that there exists an algorithm to determine - i.e., to construct - X(p￿) is
untenable.
Remark 5 The algorithmically important content of the proof is the following.
Starting with an arbitrary continuous function mapping the simplex into itself
and an arbitrary price vector, the existence of an algorithm to determine X(p￿)
entails the feasibility of a procedure to choose price sequences in some deter-
mined way to check for p￿ and to halt when such a price vector is found. Now,
the two scalars, ￿ and ￿ are determined once f(:) and p are given. But an ar-
bitrary initial price vector p, except for ￿ukes, will not be the equilibrium price
vector p￿. Therefore the existence of an algorithm would imply that there is a
systematic procedure to choose price vectors, determine the values of f(:), ￿ and
￿ and the associated excess demand vector X(p;￿;￿). At each determination
of such an excess demand vector, a projection of the given, arbitrary, f(p), on
the current X(p), for the current p, will have to be tried. This procedure must
continue till the projection for a price vector results in excess demands that
vanish for some price. Unless severe recursive constraints are imposed on price
sequences - constraints that will make very little economic sense - such a test is
algorithmically infeasible. In other words, given an arbitrary, continuous, f(:),
there is no procedure - algorithm (constructive or recursion theoretic) - by which
a sequence of price vectors, p 2 S, can be systematically tested to ￿nd p￿.
Remark 6 In the previous remark, as in the discussion before stating Theorem
4, I have assumed away the di¢ culties with uncomputable functions, prices and
11so on. They simply add to complications without changing the nature of the
content of Theorem 4.
3.4 From CGE to RCE
The undisputed pioneers of RBC theory, Kydland and Prescott, appear to claim
that the path towards RCE, and hence the benchmark for DSGE, begins with
ADGE, and ￿ was greatly advanced by Shoven and Whalley, who built on the
work of Scarf￿ , [19], p.168. However, go on Kydland and Prescott:
"Their approach is ill-suited for the general equilibrium mod-
elling of business ￿ uctuations becasue dynamics and uncertainty are
crucial to any model that attempts to study business cycels. To ap-
ply general equilibrium methods to the quantitative study of busi-
ness cycle ￿ uctuations, we need methods to compute the equilibrium
processes of dynamic stochastic economies, and speci￿c methods for
the stochastic growth model economy. Recursive competitive theory
and the use of linear-quadratic economies17 are methods that have
proven particularly useful. These tools make it possible to com-
pute the equilibrium stochastic processes of a rich class of model
economies."
ibid., p. 169
The power this particular dynamic extension of the traditional equilibrium
concept plays a signi￿cant role in the mathematized macroeconomy is further
described, four years later, by Cooley and Prescott:
"Another great advantage of the RCE approach is that for an
increasingly rich class of model economies, the equilibrium process
can be computed and can be simulated to generate equilibrium paths
for the economy. These paths can be studied to see whether model
economies mimic the behavior of actual economies and can be used
to provide quantitative answers to questions of economic welfare."
[7], p.9; italics added.
Now, there are three problems with these claims and aims. First of all, and
trivially, nowhere in the literature on mathematical economics, mathematical
macroeconomics or even in formal computability theory is there any proposi-
tion on the e¢ ciency of processes; in fact, it is quite easy to show that the
dynamic programming formulation for the RCE is, in fact computationally in-
tractable in a precise sense. Secondly, neither the ￿rst nor the second welfare
theorems are computationally feasible in the precise senses of computability
theory and constructive analysis. Thirdly, the approximation procedures used,
17It is not too much of an exaggeration to observe that the assumption of ￿ linear-quadratic
economies￿is as prevalent and as mendacious as the assumption of an aggregate production
function of a Cobb-Douglas form; neither are approximation to what they claim to represent.
12in computing the relevant RCE are provably intractable, simply because the
equilibrium is uncomputable!
I shall only deal with the second of these infelicities in this paper. Companion
pieces to this work tackle the whole set of issues more systematically.
The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics asserts the
that a competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal. A textbook formulation of the
theorem is as follows ([36], p. 145):
Theorem 7 Assume Weak monotonicity and continuity of preferences; Let
p￿ 2 <N
+ be a competitive equilibrium price vector of the economy. Let !0i,
i 2 H, be he associated individual consumption bundles, and let y0j, j 2 F;be
the associated ￿rm supply vectors. Then !0i is Pareto e¢ cient.
where:
F : set of ￿rms.
Proof. See [36], p. 145-6.
Remark 8 The theorem is proved non-constructively, using an uncomputable
equilibrium price vector to compute an equilibrium allocation. Therefore, the
contradiction step in the proof requires a comparison between an uncomputable
allocation and an arbitrary allocation, for which no computable allocation can
be devised. Moreover, the theorem assumes the intermediate value theorem in
its non-constructive form. Finally, even if the equilibrium price vector is com-
putable, the contradiction step in the proof invokes the law of the excluded middle
and is, therefore, unacceptable constructively (because it requires algorithmically
undecidable disjunctions to be employed in the decision procedure).
The Second Fundamental Welfare Theorem establishes the proposition that
any Pareto optimum can, for suitably chosen prices, be supported as a competi-
tive equilibrium. The role of the Hahn-Banach theorem in this proposition is in
establishing the suitable price system.
Lucas and Stokey state ￿ their￿version of the Hahn-Banach Theorem in the
following way18.
Theorem 9 Geometric form of the Hahn-Banch Theorem.
Let S be a normed vector space; let A;B ￿ S be convex sets. Assume:
(a). Either B has an interior point and A \ ￿ B = ;,
￿
￿ B : closure of B
￿
;
(b). Or, S is ￿nite dimensional and A \ B = ;;
18Essentially, the ￿ classical￿mathematician￿ s Hahn-Banach theorem guarantees the exten-
sion of a bounded linear functional, say ￿, from a linear subset Y of a separable normed linear
space, X, to a functional, ￿; on the whole space X, with exact preservation of norm; i.e.,
j￿j = j￿j. The constructive Hahn-Banach theorem, on the other hand, cannot deliver this
pseudo-exactness and preserves the extension as: j￿j ￿ j￿j+", 8" > 0: The role of the positive
" in the constructive version of the Hahn-Banach theorem is elegantly discussed by Nerode,
Metakides and Constable in their beautiful piece in the Bishop Memorial Volume ([26], pp.
85-91). Again, compare the di⁄erence between the ￿ classical￿IVT and the constructive IVT
to get a feel for the role of ":
13Then: 9 a continuous linear functional ￿, not identically zero on S; and a
constant c s.t:
￿(y) ￿ c ￿ ￿(x); 8x 2 A and 8y 2 B:
Next, I state the economic part of the problem in merciless telegraphic form
as follows:
There areI consumers, indexed i = 1;::::;I;
S is a vector space with the usual norm;
Consumer i chooses from commodity set Xi ￿ S, evaluated according to the
utility function ui : Xi ! <;
There are j ￿rms, indexed j = 1;::::;J;
Choice by ￿rm j is from the technology possibility set, Yj ￿ S; (evaluated
along pro￿t maximizing lines);
The mathematical structure is represented by the following absolutely stan-
dard assumptions:
1. 8i;Xi is convex;
2. 8i; if x;x0 2 Ci;ui(x) > ui(x0); and if ￿ 2 (0;1); then ui [￿x + (1 ￿ ￿)x0] >
ui(x0);
3. 8i;ui : Xi ! < is continuous;
4. The set Y =
P
j Yj is convex;
5. Either the set Y =
P
j Yj has an interior point, or S is ￿nite dimensional;
Then, the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics is:











Optimal allocation; assume, for some h 2
￿￿ 1;:::::￿ I
￿
;9^ xh 2 Xh with uh(^ xh) >
uh(x0
h): Then 9 a continuous linear functional ￿ : S ! <; not identically zero
on S, s.t:
(a). 8i;x 2 Xi and ui(x) ￿ ui(x0) =) ￿(x) ￿ ￿(x0
i);
(b). 8j;y 2 Yj =) ￿(j) ￿ ￿(y0
i );
It is a pure mechanical procedure to verify that the assumptions of the
economic problem satisfy the conditions of the Hahn-Banach Theorem and,
therefore, the powerful Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics is
￿ proved￿ 19.
The Hahn-Banach theorem does have a constructive version, but only on
subspaces of separable normed spaces. The standard, ￿ classical￿version, valid
19To the best of my knowledge an equivalence between the two, analogous to that between
the Brouwer ￿x point theorem and the Walrasian equilibrium existence theorem, proved by
Uzawa ([41]), has not been shown.
14on nonseparable normed spaces depends on Zorn￿ s Lemma which is, of course,
equivalent to the axiom of choice, and is therefore, non-constructive20.
Schechter￿ s perceptive comment on the constructive Hahn-Banach theorem is
the precept I wish economists with a numerical, computational or experimental
bent should keep in mind (ibid, p. 135).:
"[O]ne of the fundamental theorems of classical functional analysis
is the Hahn-Banach Theorem; ... some versions assert the existence
of a certain type of linear functional on a normed space X. The
theorem is inherently nonconstructive, but a constructive proof can
be given for a variant involving normed spaces X that are separable
￿i.e., normed spaces that have a countable dense subset. Little is
lost in restricting one￿ s attention to separable spaces21, for in applied
math most or all normed spaces of interest are separable. The con-
structive version of the Hahn-Banach Theorem is more complicated,
but it has the advantage that it actually ￿nds the linear functional
in question."
So, one may be excused for wondering, why economists rely on the ￿ classical￿
versions of these theorems? They are devoid of numerical meaning and compu-
tational content. Why go through the rigmarole of ￿rst formalizing in terms of
numerically meaningless and computationally invalid concepts to then seek im-
possible and intractable approximations to determine uncomputable equilibria,
undecidably e¢ cient allocations, and so on?
Thus my question is: why should an economist force the economic domain
to be a normed vector space? Why not a separable normed vector space? Isn￿ t
this because of pure ignorance of constructive mathematics and a carelessness
about the nature and scope of fundamental economic entities and the domain
over which they should be de￿ned?
On the other hand, the ￿rst fundamental theorem of welfare economics fails
constructively and computably on three grounds: the dependence on the in-
termediate value theorem (non-constructive), the use of an uncomputable equi-
libirum price vector in the proof by contradiction (uncomputability) and the
use of the law of the excluded middle in the proof by contradiction (non-
constructivity).
Under these conditions, the equilibrium of the canonical SDGE model, RCE,
cannot, in any formal algorithmic sense be e⁄ectively or constructively com-
puted; therefore, no equilibrium process can e⁄ectively be determined to show
convergence to a balanced growth path.
20This is not a strictly accurate statement, although this is the way many advanced books
on functional analysis tend to present the Hahn-Banach theorem. For a reasonably accessible
discussion of the precise dependency of the Hahn-Banach theorem on the kind of axiom of
choice (i.e., whether countable axiom of choice or the axiom of dependent choice), see [21].
For an even better and fuller discussion of the Hahn-Banach theorem, both from ￿ classical￿
and a constructive points of view, Schechter￿ s encyclopedic treatise is unbeatable ([32]).
21However, it must be remembered that Ishihara, [16], has shown the constructive validity
of the Hahn-Banach theorem also for uniformly convex spaces.
15Finally, the mathematical structure of the space on which the value function
and the policy function are de￿ned is such that the existence of a ￿x point for
the contraction operator that is invoked is non-algorithmizable. This is because
Cauchy Completeness is assumed for the space over which the contraction is
implemented. Cauchy Completeness, can be stated as:
Theorem 11 Every Cauchy sequence in R converges to an element of R
This theorem is, in turn, proved using the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem,
which contains an unconstructi￿able - i.e., non-algorithmic and hence impossible
to utilise in a consistent ￿ computational experiment￿- undecidable disjunction
in its proof!
In other words, the computational program of mathematizing macroeco-
nomics by formulating optimal decision problems as dynamic programming
problems is impossible.
3.5 Agent-based computational methods and adaptive dy-
namics
The origins of what has become agent based computational methods can be
traced to the pioneering works of Turing on Morphogenesis [40], von Neumann
on The Theory of Self-Reproducing Automata ([51]), and Ulam on Nonlinear
dynamics ([12], [37]). A ￿ second generation￿of pioneers were Conway ([2]) and
Wolfram [53]), the former directly in the von Neumann tradition and the latter
straddling the von Neumann and Ulam traditions ￿i.e., working on the interface
between cellular automata modelling and dynamical system interpretation of the
transition equations.
Remarkably, there was an independent tradition in economics, pioneered
by Richard Goodwin ([13]), in his computational studies of coupled markets,
which directly inspired Herbert Simon￿ s approach to the computational study
of evolutionary dynamics in terms of semi-decomposable linear systems ([?]).
Sadly, none of these classics have had the slightest impact on the current
frontiers of agent based computational economics (see, for example, [38]). Had
any awareness of the classics, their frameworks, the questions they posed, the
tentative answers they obtained, the research directions they suggested had been
absorbed, even in some rudimentary way, many of the exaggerated claims and
assertions of the advocates of agent based computable economics would have
been less absurd, more measured and, surely, also humbler in the expectations
of what this line of computational research could and must achieve. An example
of the utterly untenable claim of a senior advocate of agent based computational
economics may convey our sadness of the lack of anchoring in the classics more
vividly. In his chapter, titled Agent-Based Macro ([38], p. 1626; italics added),
Axel Leijonhufvud asserts that:
"Agent-based computational methods provide the only way in which
the self-regulatory capabilities of complex dynamic models can be ex-
16plored so as to advance our understanding of the adaptive dynamics
of actual economies."
Quite apart from the many unde￿ned ￿even formally unde￿nable unam-
biguously ￿concepts in this remarkably unscholarly statement, the extraordi-
nary claim that ￿ agent-based computational methods provide the only way￿ to
understand anything, let alone of the ￿ adaptive dynamics of actual economies￿ ,
must make the scienti￿c spirit of Goodwin and Simon writhe in intellectual pain
￿not to mention the noble ghosts of Ulam, von Neumann and Turing.
What are ￿ agent-based computational methods￿? Do they transcend Turing
Machine computation? If so, how ￿and why? How does one link a computa-
tionally implemented method with a complex dynamical system, even assuming
that it is possible to de￿ne such a thing unambiguously and consistent with the
dynamics of a computation?
On the other hand, agent based computable economic practice is closely
tied to the belief that such models are capable of generating so-called ￿ emergent
phenomena￿ , in the sense that their existence cannot be predicted from the un-
derpinning laws of individual agent interactions. Very little scholarship on the
rich tradition of philosophical, epistemological, computational and dynamic re-
search ￿with a solid contribution to the epistemology of simulation (cf. [52]) ￿on
￿ emergence￿is manifested in the frontier research by agent based computational
economists (a paradigmatic example of in￿ ated claims and de￿cient scholarship
on agent based computational modelling, the tortuous concept of ￿ reductionism￿
and the possibility of so-called ￿ emergent aggregative phenomena￿can be found
in [10]).
No better characterisation of the practice of agent based computational
economists can be given that the one Arthur Burks gave (cf. [5], p. xviii),
on a related ￿ procedure for investigating cellular spaces￿ :
"The investigator starts with a certain global behavior and wants
to ￿nd a transition function for a cellular automaton which exhibits
that behaviour. He then chooses as subgoals certain elementary
behavioral functions and proceeds to de￿ne his transition function
piece-meal so as to obtain these behaviors.
.....
The task of searching for a transition function which produces
a speci￿ed behavior is an arduous task because there are so many
possible partial transition functions to explore."
The formal di¢ culties of ￿ searching for a transition function￿are provably
intractable, at best; algorithmically undecidable, in general. Even when found,
depending on the way the data generating process if characterised, whether
the transition function ￿when viewed as a ￿nite automaton ￿￿ halts￿at the
prescribed state is, again, in general, algorithmically undecidable, Correspond-
ingly, when viewed as a dynamical system, whether the global behaviour is an
attractor or is in a particular basin of attraction of the dynamical system, is al-
gorithmicall undecidable. Whether a set of initial conditions, for the transition
17function, can be algorithmically determined such that their halting state is the
desired global behaviour, or such that the global behaviour is in the basin of
attraction of the transition function as a dynamical system is decidable only for
trivial sets.
Suppose we succeed in ￿nding such a transition function ￿as many agent
based computational economists claim they can, and have ￿and want to char-
acterise it either in terms of computability theory or as a dynamical system.
Suppose, also, that we ask the questions the pioneers asked: the feasibility of
self-reproduction, self-reconstruction, evolution, computation universality, de-
cidability of limit sets of the transition function when interpreted as a dynam-
ical system, whether the transition function, viewed as an ￿nite automaton, is
subject to the Halting Problem, and so on. At the least, any reasonable notion
of ￿ emergence￿requires unambiguous answers to most of these question ￿all of
which are, in general, subject to algorithmic undecidabilities.
4 A Brief Excursion on Negishi￿ s Method
"In [Negishi￿ s Method] ￿xed point theorems are applied on the utility
simplex."
[6], p. 138
There are those who seem to think it is possible to circumvent the dilem-
mas posed by computability and constructivity issues in proving the existence
of an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium by appealing to the ￿rst fundamental theorem
of welfare economics and applying a relevant ￿xed point theorem on the utility
simplex, rather than on the price simplex. This approach has come to be called
Negishi￿ s Method ([22], [17], in particular, pp. 52-57) in the mathematical eco-
nomic and computational economics literature. It is easy to show that all of
the computability and constructivity conundrums discussed above remain un-
scathed in the Negishi mathematical framework. A brief excursus on this claim
may not be out of place here.
Negishi himself, re￿ ecting on his youthful masterpiece more than three decades
later (Negishi, 1994, p. xiv; italics added), remarked:
"The method of proof used in this essay [i.e., in [22]] has been found
useful also for such problems as equilibrium in in￿nite dimensional
space and computation of equilibria."
What exactly was Negishi￿ s method of proof and how did it contribute to
the computation of equilibria?
A characterisation of the di⁄erence between the standard approach to prov-
ing the existence of an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, and its computation, by a
t￿tonnement procedure ￿i.e., algorithm ￿of a mapping from the price simplex
to itself, and the alternative Negishi method of iterating the weights assigned to
individual utility functions that go into the de￿nition of a social welfare function
18which is maximised to determine ￿i.e., compute ￿the equilibrium, captures
the key innovative aspect of the latter approach. Essentially, therefore, the dif-
ference between the standard approach to the proof of existence of equilibrium
Arrow-Debreu prices, and their computation, and the Negishi approach boils
down to the following:
￿ The standard approach proves the existence of Arrow-Debreu equilibrium
prices by an appeal to a ￿xed point theorem and computes them ￿the
equilibrium prices ￿by invoking the Uzawa equivalence theorem (Uzawa,
1960) and devising an algorithm for the excess demand functions that map
a price simplex into itself to determine the ￿xed point ([30]).
￿ The Negishi approach proves, given initial endowments, the existence of
individual welfare weights de￿ning a social welfare function, whose maxi-
mization (subject to the usual constraints) determines the identical Arrow-
Debreu equilibrium. The standard mapping of excess demand functions,
mapping a price simplex into itself to determine a ￿xed point, is replaced
by a mapping from the space of utility weights into itself, appealing to the
same kind of ￿xed point theorem (in this case, the Kakutani ￿xed point
theorem) to prove the existence of equilibrium prices.
￿ In other words, the method of proof of existence of equilibrium prices
in the one approach is replaced by the proof of existence of ￿ equilibrium
utility weights￿ , both appealing to traditional ￿xed point theorems ([3],
[50], and [18]22).
￿ In both cases, the computation of equilibrium prices on the one hand
and, on the other, the computation of equilibrium weights, algorithms are
devised that are claimed to determine (even if only approximately) the
same ￿xed points.
Takashi Negishi￿ s outstanding ￿ contributions to economic analysis￿are bril-
liantly and comprehensively surveyed by Warren Young in his recent paper
([55]). Young￿ s paper provides a particularly appropriate background to the
issues here. It ￿Young￿ s paper ￿is especially relevant also because his elegant
summary of Negishi￿ s ￿ contribution to economic analysis￿identi￿es [22] as one
of the two crucial pillars23 on which to tell a coherent and persuasive story of
what he calls the Negishi ￿ research program￿(ibid, p. 162; second set of italics,
added):
"To sum up, a number of major research programs can be iden-
ti￿ed, therefore, as emanating from Negishi￿ s now classic papers,
22There is a curious ￿albeit inessential ￿￿ typo￿in Negishi￿ s reference to Kakutani￿ s classic
as having been published in 1948. The ￿ typo￿is not ￿ corrected￿even in the reprinted version
of [22] in [24].
23The other one being [23]. I am in full agreement with Young important observation that
it is [22] that is more important, which is why I have added italics to the phrase ￿ almost as
in￿uential￿ , in the above quote.
19that of (1960) [[22]] and 1961 [[23]], respectively. Negishi￿ s 1960
paper forms the basis for both ￿ theoretical￿and ￿ applied￿research
programs in general equilibrium analysis, and his 1961 paper ... has
been almost as in￿uential in demarcating ongoing research up to the
present in the ￿eld of imperfect competition and non-tatonnement
processes. These papers ... attest to Negishi￿ s considerable in￿ uence
on the development of modern economic theory and analysis."
However, no one ￿ to the best of my knowledge ￿ has studied Negishi￿ s
method of proof from the point of view of constructivity and computability, the
issues that are central here. Young￿ s perceptive - and, in my opinion, entirely
correct - identi￿cation of the crucial role played by [22] in ￿ both "theoreti-
cal" and "applied" research program in general equilibrium analysis￿is, in fact,
about methods of existence proofs and computable general equilibrium (CGE),
and its o⁄shoots, in the form of applied computable general equilibrium analysis
ACGE) ￿even leading up to current frontiers in computational issues in DSGE
models (cf., [17], pp. 52-57, for example).
Before I turn to these issues of the constructivity and computability of
Negishi￿ s method of existence proofs and the underpinning of some aspects
computation in CGE and ACGE models in Negishi￿ s approach (rather than,
for example, in the standard approach pioneered by Scarf, [30]), there is one
important economic theoretic confusion that needs to be sorted out. This is the
question of the role played by the fundamental theorems of welfare economics
in Negishi￿ s method of the proof of the existence of a general (Walrasian) equi-
librium.
It is generally agreed that the Negishi method of existence proof is an applica-
tions of ￿xed point theorems on the utility simplex, in contrast to the ￿ standard￿
way of applying such theorems to the price simplex (cf., the above quote from
Cheng). This fact has generated a remarkable confusion on the question of which
fundamental theorem of welfare economics underpins the Negishi method! For
a method that has been around for over half a century, it is somewhat disheart-
ening to note that frontier research and researchers seem still to be confused
on which of the two fundamental theorem of welfare economics is relevant in
Negishi￿ s method. Thus, we ￿nd Judd, as recently as only a few years ago
(op.cit, pp. 52-3) claiming, unreservedly, that (italics added):
"The Negishi method exploits the ￿rst theorem of welfare economics,
which states that any competitive equilibrium of an Arrow-Debreu
model is Pareto e¢ cient."
On the other hand, Warren Young (op.cit, p.152; italics added) equally
con￿dentially stating that:
In his pioneering 1960 paper, Negishi provided a completely new
way of proving the existence of equilibrium, via the Second Welfare
Theorem. He established equivalence between the equilibrium prob-
lem set out by Arrow-Debreu and what has been called ￿ mathemati-
cal programming￿ , thereby developing a ￿ method￿that has been used
20with much success by later economists working in both theoretical
and applied general equilibrium modelling ... ."
Fortunately, Negishi himself returned to a discussion of the ￿ Negishi method,
or Negishi approach￿more recently ([25], p. 168) and may have helped sort out
this conundrum (ibid, p. 167; italics added):
"The so-called Negishi method, or Negishi approach, has often
been used in studies of dynamic in￿nite-dimensional general equilib-
rium theory, and the numerical computation of such equilibria ... .
This method is an application of the Negishi theorem (Negishi 1960),
which demonstrates the existence of a general equilibrium using the
￿rst theorem of welfare economics, which states that any competitive
equilibrium of an Arrow-Debreu model is Pareto e¢ cient. In other
words, a general equilibrium of a competitive economy is considered
as the maximization of a kind of social welfare function (i.e., the
properly weighted sum of individual utilities, where the weights are
inversely proportional to the marginal utility of income."
Negishi is one of those rare economists who is both a scholar of the history
of economic theory and one of the most competent general equilibrium theorists
and ￿even if he had not been the originator of the Negishi method ￿therefore
one may feel forced to reject Warren Young￿ s claim24!
As a matter of fact, from my Computable Economics ￿i.e., from a construc-
tivist and recursion theoretic - point of view, this conundrum is a non-problem
for several reasons. First of all, both fundamental theorems of welfare economics
are proved non-constructively and lead to uncomputable equilibria. Secondly,
all ￿to the best of my knowledge ￿of the current algorithms utilised in CGE,
ACGE and DSGE modelling appeal to undecidable disjunctions and are ef-
fectively meaningless from a computablity point of view. Thirdly, and most
importantly, Negishi￿ s theorem25 is, itself, proved nonconstructively.
There are two theorems in [22]. I shall concentrate on Theorem 2 (ibid, p.5),
which (I think) is the more important one and the one that came to play the
important role justly attributed to it via the Negishi Research Program outlined
by Young (op.cit)26.
24The puzzle here is that the Young and Negishi articles appear ￿ back-to-back￿ , in the same
issue of the International Journal of Economic Theory and the two distingusihed authors
thank each other handsomely in their respective acknowledgements! Just for the record, my
own view is the following. My strong conviction is that Negishi￿ s theorem provides the ￿ only
if ￿part of the ￿rst fundamental theorem of welfare conomics.
25Negishi￿ s theorem is one thing; Negishi￿ s method is quite a di⁄erent thing. The latter
should refer to the ￿ method of proof￿ , but the vast literature on the issue ￿admirably doc-
umented in [55] ￿ is not fee of confusion on this point. Essentially, the ￿ method￿refers to
the fact that a mapping is de￿ned, not on the price simplex, but on the ￿ utility simplex￿(as
mentioned above with a reference to [6]).
26To demonstrate the nonconstructive elements of Theorem 1 (ibid, p.5), I would need to
include almost a tutorial on constructive mathematics to make clear the notion of compactness
that is legitimate in constructive analysis. For reasons of ￿ readability￿and ￿ deeper￿reasons of
21Proposition 12 The Proof of the Existence of Maximising Welfare Weights in
the Negishi Theorem is Nonconstructive
Remark 13 Negishi￿ s proof relies on satisfying the Slater (Complementary)
Slackness Conditions ([35]27). Slater￿ s proof28 of these conditions invoke the
Kakutani ￿xed point theorem (Theorem 1 in [18]), and Kakutani￿ s Min-Max
Theorem (Theorem 3, ibid). These two theorems, in turn, invoke Theorem 2
and the Corollary (ibid, p.458), which are based on Theorem 1 (ibid, p. 457).
This latter theorem is itself based on the validity of the Brouwer ￿xed point
theorem, which is Non-constructi￿able (cf., [4]).
Proposition 14 The vector of maximising welfare weights, derived in the Negishi
Theorem, is uncomputable
Remark 15 A straightforward implication of the previous proposition.
Discovering the exact nature and source of appeals to nonconstructive modes
of reasoning, appeals to undecidable disjunctions and reliance on nonconstruc-
tive mathematical entities in the formulation of a theorem is a tortuous exercise.
The nature of the pervasive presence of these three elements ￿i.e., nonconstruc-
tive modes of reasoning, primarily the reliance on tertium non datur, undecid-
able disjunctions and nonconstructive mathematical entities ￿in any standard
theorem and its proof, and the di¢ culties of discovering them, is elegantly out-
lined by Fred Richman:
￿Even those who like algorithms have remarkably little appreci-
ation of the thoroughgoing algorithmic thinking that is required for
a constructive proof. This is illustrated by the nonconstructive na-
ture of many proofs in books on numerical analysis, the theoretical
study of practical numerical algorithms. I would guess that most
realist mathematicians are unable even to recognize when a proof is
constructive in the intuitionist￿ s sense.
It is a lot harder than one might think to recognize when a the-
orem depends on a nonconstructive argument. One reason is that
proofs are rarely self-contained, but depend on other theorems whose
proofs depend on still other theorems. These other theorems have of-
ten been internalized to such an extent that we are not aware whether
or not nonconstructive arguments have been used, or must be used,
in their proofs. Another reason is that the law of excluded middle
aesthetics and mathematical philosophy, I shall refer to my two main results in this section
as￿ Propositions￿and their plausible validity as ￿ Remarks￿ , and not as ￿ Theorems￿and ￿ Proofs￿ ,
respectively.
27This classic by Slater must easily qualify for inclusion in the class of pioneering articles
that remained forever in the ￿ samizdat￿ status of a Discussion Paper!
28I should add that the applied general equilibrium theorists who use Negishi￿ s method to
￿ compute￿(uncomputable) equilibria do not seem to be fully aware of the implications of some
of the key assumptions in Slater￿ s complementary slackness conditions. That [22] is aware of
them is clear from his Assumption 2 and Lemma 1.
22[LEM] is so ingrained in our thinking that we do not distinguish
between di⁄erent formulations of a theorem that are trivially equiv-
alent given LEM, although one formulation may have a constructive
proof and the other not.￿
[29], p.125; italics added.
5 Beyond DSGE & ABE ￿ Towards a Computable
Approach to Economic Modelling
￿Computer science ... is not actually a science. It does not
study natural objects. Neither is it, as you might think, mathemat-
ics; although it does use mathematical reasoning pretty extensively.
Rather, computer science is like engineering - it is all about getting
something to do something, rather than just dealing with abstrac-
tions ... . ...But this is not to say that computer science is all
practical, down to earth bridge-building. Far from it. Computer
science touches on a variety of deep issues. ... . It naturally en-
courages us to ask questions about the limits of computability, about
what we can and cannot know about the world around us.￿
[11], p.xiii; italics added.
￿ Does nature compute?￿ , is a question natural scientists ask with increasing
frequency. The di⁄erential equations, or maps, that seem to characterise the
dynamical systems of nature are hardly ever analytically ￿ solvable￿ . Either we
must try to devise and evolve an epistemology to come to terms with ￿ unsolvabil-
ity￿and, therefore, accept a ￿ truth de￿cit￿￿that ￿ true￿solutions are inherently
unreachable ￿ or ￿nd other ways to represent nature￿ s processes. One such
alternative way is to interpret nature￿ s processes as computations. But compu-
tations, too, may not ￿ halt￿ .
What, then, if the economy is itself a computer? Do economic processes,
whether aggregative or not, embody the results of a computation? Do we,
as economists, observing the economy￿ s computational processes, impute com-
putability properties to the economy?
A master dynamical system theorist outlined the dilemma cogently:
"We regard the computer as an ￿ oracle￿ which we ask ques-
tions. Questions are formulated as input data for sets of calculations.
There are two possible outcomes to the computer￿ s work: either the
calculations rigorously con￿rm that a phase portrait is correct, or
they fail to con￿rm it. .... The theory that we present states that if
one begins with a structurally stable vector ￿eld, there is input data
that will yield a proof that a numerically computed phase portrait
is correct. However, this fails to be completely conclusive from an
algorithmic point of view, because one has no way of verifying that
a vector ￿eld is structurally stable in advance of a positive outcome.
23Thus, if one runs a set of trials of increasing precision, the computer
will eventually produce a proof of correctness of a phase portrait for
a structurally stable vector ￿eld. Presented with a vector ￿eld that
is not structurally stable, the computer will not con￿rm this fact:; it
will only fail in its attempted proof of structural stability29. Prag-
matically, we terminate the calculation when the computer produces
a de￿nitive answer or our patience is exhausted. ....
The situation described in the previous paragraph is analogous
to the question of producing a numerical proof that a continuous
function has a zero. ..... Numerical proofs that a function vanishes
can be expected to succeed only when the function has qualitative
properties that can be veri￿ed with ￿nite-precision calculations."
[14], pp.154-5, italics added.
Analogous to Guckenheimer￿ s thought experiment, if the data set generated
by the economy as a computer is recursively enumerable but not recursive, infer-
ences abut the computability properties of the economy will remain incomplete.
On the other hand, if we ￿as observers ￿feed the economy with data sets that
are also recursively enumerable but not recursive, then whether the economy, as
a computer, will be able to process it in a de￿nitive way will remain unknown
for an indeterminate period. This does not, of course, mean that in some Math-
ematical Platonic universe, the economy is not algorithmically decidable.
Whether de￿nitive knowledge of the structure of the economy can be ob-
tained by observing its processes will depend on the metaphors we use to char-
acterise it; for example, characterising the economy as a ￿nite automaton or a
dynamical system whose limit sets are stable limit points makes it easy to infer
structural properties by observations of the outcome of its processes. This is
the standard approach to modelling and inference of economic dynamics.
In the computable approach to economics, the starting point is that the
economy is a Turing Machine and the data it generates forms a set that is
recursively enumerable but not recursive. If so, what can be inferred about the
structure of the economy may only be explored by Turing Machine computation,
without any guarantee that a de￿nitive answer will be obtained.
Computation in economics becomes epistemologically meaningful only when
the economic modeller, using computational metaphors to analyse the data gen-
erated by the economy, begins to accept, at least pro tempore, that the economy,
its constituents and its institutions are themselves computers30. This is the
natural mode of interaction between the economy and the classical behavioural
economist and the computable economist. The latter is a ￿eld I have explored
29A reader, equipped with the standard knowledge of classical recursion theory, would
immediately invoke the distinction between recursive and recursively enumerable sets to make
precise sense of this important observation.
30Throughout this paper the reference is to the digital computer. However, in view of
several important results by Rubel, Pour-El and others, summarised in [48], there is no loss
of serious generality in interpreting the references to ￿ computers￿as applying to a large class
of analog computers, too.
24and summarised in [42] and [46]. A ￿ bird￿ s eye￿view of the former is given in
[45].
It is not the natural mode for the CGE theorist, nor for the agent based
computational economist. This is why there is a serious epistemological de￿cit
in the practice of the latter two classes of economists.
Any attempt at going beyond DSGE and ABE, from the point of view of
a computational epistemology ￿i.e., seeking knowledge from numerically mean-
ingful modelling exercises ￿may not do much worse than adopt the methods,
philosophy and framework of the classical behavioural economist and the com-
putable economist. This is especially so in view of the fact that the economic
foundations of computable economics is largely consistent with the basics of
classical behavioural economics. Developing this theme fully would, perhaps,
be a sequel to this paper.
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